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I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 1, 1985, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal affirmed a
summary judgment granted in favor of multiple plaintiffs in their suit for return
of security deposits made to a condominium developer.' The judgment rescinded
the parties' contracts and ordered the return of over $2.5 million in security
deposits and accrued interest. 2 Aside from the large dollar value of the judgment,
this result is noteworthy because the developer had breached no covenants and
had not committed fraud.3 Rather, the developer had neglected to comply with
the provisions of a "little-known ' 4 federal statute called the Interstate Land
5
Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSA).
The application of ILSA to condominium sales could have' a far-reaching
impact on the housing industry. Condominium sales in the United States have
increased dramatically in recent years.6 Florida, in particular, has experienced
*

Editor's Note: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for the best

student note submitted in the Spring 1985 semester.
I. Appalachian, Inc. v. Olson, 468 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985).
2. Id.; see Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, Appalachian, Inc. v. Olson, 468 So. 2d 266 (Fla.
2d D.C.A. 1985) (on file at Univ. of Fla. L. Rev. office). &e also Galterio v. Appalachian, Inc.,
No. 83-2381-CA (12th Cir. Ct., Aug. 14, 1984), appeal docketed No. 84-2021 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.)

(summary judgment for purchasers based on the same fact situation as in Olson).
3. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, Appalachian, Inc. v. Olson, 468 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1985).

4.
(1984).

Peretz, Rescission Under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 58 FLA. B.J. 297, 297

5.
15 U.S.C. 5 1701-1720 (1982).
6. The number of condominium owners jumped from 1.2 million in 1975 to over 2.2 million
in 1980. Condos Take Over Real Estate Market, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REP., Nov. 10, 1980, at 78.
945
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rapid population growth, 7 and a corresponding rise in condominium ownership."
Florida has consistently led the nation in condominium sales, ' and any modification in the law regulating such sales would have a profound effect on
condominium development and on the relationship between developers and purchasers.
This Note will examine the application of ILSA to the sale of condominium
units and investigate its potentially disastrous impact on condominium developers. The Note will review the circumstances which led to the passage of the
Act and analyze the recent conflict among various jurisdictions over whether
ILSA applies to the sale of condominium units or only to the sale of undeveloped
land. Finally, the Note will examine whether application of ILSA to condominium sales is appropriate in light of the Act's purpose, the protections it offers,
the protections afforded by other sources, and the hardships imposed both by
compliance and non-compliance with the Act. The focus will be primarily on
the impact in Florida, although the implications are national in character.
II.

BACKGROUND FOR THE PASSAGE OF

ILSA

ILSA was the federal government's response to wholesale interstate land
fraud. The use of the mails for interstate land sales proliferated in the 1960's,
and abuses soon became widespread.'" Unscrupulous promoters utilized a variety
of schemes to unload undesirable realty onto unsuspecting and ill-informed
investors and consumers." In most cases, developers fraudulently represented
the characteristics of the land to be sold.' 2 However, problems also arose with

7.

Florida's population increased from 6,791,418 in 1970 to 9,739,992 in 1980. BUREAU OF
& Bus. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF FLA. 1981 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 17.
8. In 1980, approximately 1,400,000 persons lived in 600,000 condominium units in Florida.
DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES & CONDOMINIUMS, DEP'T OF Bus. REG., CONDOMINIUM CONVERSIONS IN FLORIDA: A REPORT TO GOVERNOR BOB GRAHAM 4 (1980). In 1982, one commentator
estimated that twenty-five percent of Florida's population resided in condominiums. Nagin, The
Condominium Coversion Craze: What's Happening in Florida?, 55 FLA. B.J. 74, 74 (1981).
9. See, e.g., 1972 Fla. Laws 171: "WHEREAS, .The Florida Condominium industry leads
thL nation on a per capita basis in number of units and dollar volume ...
"
10. See generally Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 1966: Hearings on S. 2672 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings]. Elderly persons were the primary target of these schemes, but the
promoters' scope broadened with the expansion of the industry. See generally Hearings Before the
Subcomm on Frauds and Misrepresentations Affecting the Elderly of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
11. See generally 1966 Hearings, supra note 10.
12. One humorous anecdote surfaced in the 1966 Hearings. A woman in New England had
purchased land in Oregon sight-unseen. She wrote to the district attorney to inquire about the
land. The district attorney replied, in part:
You asked me if I can dispose of your land. I cannot and do not think I could give
it away. I am not in the real estate business, but have practiced law in Oregon for about
40 years and while lawyers are often accused of crimes and misdemeanors and practices
not consistent with good morals, justly or otherwise, yet I have never known a lawyer
who has been guilty of selling such land as yours, even to an enemy; this, for two reasons,
first the honor that every lawyer possesses would deter him from an act of this kind, and,
secondly, he could not sell it.
EcON.
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well-intentioned developers who lacked the capital to accomplish their ambitious
undeveloped realty,'4 often
development plans.' 3 In general, these sales involved
5
including the proverbial Florida swampland.'
Prior to the passage of ILSA, purchasers relied on a variety of inadequate
remedies for their protection. Purchasers could bring a common law action for
fraud or misrepresentation; however, such actions carried a high burden of
proof.' 6 In addition, the rule of caveat emptor was still in force, rendering the
purchaser's task more difficult.' 7 State laws afforded some protection, most no9
tably through "Blue Sky" law.'I and subdivision sales control legislation.' In
addition, the federal government provided regulation through its mail fraud
2
'
statutes 0 and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulation of advertising.
Contemporary commentators, however, considered this patchwork collection
22
of federal and state regulation inadequate for protecting consumers. The mail
fraud statutes required a showing of scienter and punished promoters without
If the gambling microbe has entered in your system and you must gamble, hunt up
a poker game at home and sit in but leave Western land games to the people of the
West.... Your land has no present value.... It is very hard, rough, rocky and destitute
of vegetation of any kind and the whole section would not support more than a jackrabbit
and his wife, and, if there were any children, they would be compelled to go to Nevada
to keep from starving to death. Your land is about 111 miles from a road and not more
than 20 from Hades and owing to the roads and the nearness of the latter place, few
people go to the railroad.
1966 Hearings, supra note 10, at 20 (cited in Coffey & Welch, Federal Regulation of Land Sales: Full
Disclosure Comes Down to Earth, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 5, 71 n.378 (1969)).
13. See Coffey & Welch, supra note 12, at 10.
14. See generally 1966 Hearings, supra note 10.
15. In one scheme, a developer bought Florida swampland for $45 an acre and sold it to
purchasers sight-unseen for $245 an acre. The purchasers discovered the land had not been surveyed,
and their lots could not be identified. Moreover, the State Flood Commission had an easement
over the land which allowed it to flood the land in order to prevent flooding to other areas. Note,
S. 275 - The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 714, 714 n.4 (1967).
16. At common law the purchaser would have to prove five elements in order to obtain relief
on a claim of fraud or misrepresentation:
(I) a false representation of a material fact;
(2) knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation was false
(i.e., scienter);
(3) an intention to induce the plaintiff to act in reliance upon the misrepresentation;
(4) justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff; and
(5) damage to the plaintiff resulting from the reliance.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROssER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 5 105 (5th ed. 1984).
The purchaser would also be forced to contend with the affirmative defenses of laches, estoppel,
waiver, and ratification. See Coffey & Welch, supra note 12, at 51-52.
17. For a discussion of the application of caveat emptor to interstate land sales, see Morris,
The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act: Analysis and Evaluation, 24 S.C.L. REv. 331, 332-33 (1972).
18. "Blue Sky" laws represent the states' efforts at securities regulation. In many states, the
coverage has been extended to the sale of real estate. L. Loss & E. CowETT, BLuE SKY LAw 3
(1958).
19. For a discussion of state Blue Sky and Subdivision Sales Control legislation, see Note,
supra note 15, at 720-22.
20. See 18 U.S.C. 5 1341 (1964); 39 U.S.C. 5 4005 (1964).
21. 15 U.S.C. 5 45 (1964).
22. See, e.g., Note, Interstate Land Sales Regulations. The Case for an Expanded Federal Role, 6 U.
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providing a remedy to purchasers. 2 3 The FTC was not authorized to enjoin
deceptive practices until after administrative proceedings and judicial review of
final orders.2 4 In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson endorsed ILSA as a potential
remedy to the uncoordinated system of regulation.2 5 The President's message
to Congress emphasized the need for federal involvement in the interstate sale
26
of undeveloped land.
Simultaneously, the federal government struggled to regulate the burgeoning
field of condominium sales. Condominium ownership had long been a standard
form of living arrangement in Europe. 27 Its advent in the United States, however, was relatively recent. 2 1 In practice, condominium purchasers acquire in29
dividual ownership of distinct units in a multi-unit structure. Purchasers also
typically acquire an undivided interest in the "common elements" of the building, along with the right to use these elements with the other unit owners."o
The federal government delegated responsibility for the protection of condominium purchasers to three agencies: the Post Office, the FTC, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)."' Of these agencies, the SEC apMICH. J.L. REP. 511 (1973); Note, supra note 15, at 715; Coffey & Welch, supra note 12, at 1112.
23. Coffey & Welch, supra note 12, at 11.
24.

Id. at 11-12.

25.
26.

S. 275, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
The President's message stated, in relevant part:
Many investors - particularly older Americans - are attracted to advertisements offering inexpensive retirement homesites. The interstate mail-order sales of such land runs
into millions of dollars each year.
Most buyers get what they pay for. But, according to evidence obtained by the Senate
Subcommittee on Frauds and Misrepresentations Affecting the Elderly, "slippery language
and omission of important facts" have given too many buyers grossly distorted impressions
of the land they later purchased.
Some of our senior citizens have become victims of subtle and sharp sales practices.
They have wasted much of their life savings on a useless piece of desert or swampland.
A number of states have enacted legislation to deal with these abuses. But only the
Federal Government can have effective authority over interstate mail order sales. Only the
exercise of such authority can protect the buyer and legitimate seller alike against loss and
injury.
I recommend the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act of 1967 to afford the public
greater safeguards against sharp and unscrupulous practices.
H.R. Doe. No. 57, 90th Cong., lstSess. 113, reprinted in CoNo. REC. 3527, 3529 (Feb. 16, 1967).
27. See Kerr, Condominium - Statutory Implementation, 38 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1, 3-5 (1963);
Teyser, The Ownership of Flats - A Comparative Study, 7 INT'L & COM. L.Q. 31 (1958).
28. In 1958, Puerto Rico became the first American jurisdiction to enact a condominium
statute. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31 §5 1291-1293 (1968).
29. 3 R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS S 39.03(2) (1981). See also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 363 (Rev. 4th ed. 1979); FLA. STAT. § 718.103(9) (1985).
30.

See Lawyer Counseling Considerations in Representing Condominium Purchasers, 10 REAL PROP.,

PROB. & TRUST J.
REAL PROPERTY

(1974);

31.

464 (1975). For discussions of condominium ownership in general, see R.
§§631-633.33 (1973); R. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND

POWELL,
PRACTICE

Berger, Condominium: Sheltet on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 987 (1963).

To a lesser extent, the Federal Reserve Board and the Internal Revenue Service also

had regulatory duties. See Note, Condominium Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 639,

650-53 (1975).
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parently afforded the greatest promise.3 2 The Securities Act of 1933 provided
that all sales of "securities," unless specifically exempted, must be registered
with the SEC. 3 3 The SEC subsequently adopted a broad definition of "security, 1"3 and the Supreme Court concluded that a sale of resort condominiums,
contract" and
together with a rental arrangement, could be an "investment
35
therefore a "security" within the meaning of the 1933 Act.
SEC regulation, however, proved ineffectual. Commentators have opposed
SEC jurisdiction on three grounds: (1) the lack of congressional intent to include
real property within the Act; (2) the SEC's lack of real property expertise; and
3 6
Moreover, the SEC's
(3) the unnecessary burdens imposed on developers.
jurisdiction did not include the sale of condominiums primarily for residential
purposes.3 7 A more fundamental problem was that many of the special problems
inherent in the sale of condominiums could not be resolved by conventional
registration requirements. Condominium d'eals, more so than sales of undeveloped land, are susceptible to sophisticated arrangements which, while not technically fraudulent, cause buyers to expend excessive amounts for unforeseen
38
contingencies.
Federal involvement in the area of consumer protection thus took on greater
proportions in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Congress, however, manifested
no comprehensive plan in its regulation of either undeveloped land or condo39
miniums. "The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act attempted to deal
with at least the first of these two areas. Whether the federal government's
newly fostered interest in condominium regulation converged with its existing
concern over the fraudulent sale bf undeveloped land, however, is questionable.
Before analyzing this question, consideration of the literal provisions of ILSA
will be beneficial.

32. The literature on the relationship between federal securities law and condominium sales
is extensive. See, e.g., Berman & Stone, Federal Securities Law and the Sale of Condominiums, Homes,
and Homesites, 30 Bus. LAw. 411 (1975); Clurman, Condominiums as Securities: A Current Look, 19
N.Y.L.F. 457 (1974); Hoisington, Condominiums and the Corporate Securities Law, 14 HAsTiNs L.J.
241 (1963); Rosenbaum, The Resort Condominium and the Federal Securities Laws - A Case Study in
Governmental Inflteibility, 60 VA. L. REv. 785 (1974).
33. Note, supra note 31, at 651; see also 15 U.S.C. S 77(c) (1982 Supp.).
34. Note, supra note 31, at 652.
35. In a landmark decision, the United States Supreme Court formulated the test for an

investment contract which is covered by the Securities Act of 1933:
A contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal
certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
36.
37.

Note, supra note 31, at 653.
Note, Federal Securities Regulation of Condominiums: A Purchaser's Perspective, 62 GEo. L.J.

1403, 1408 (1974).
38.
39.

See infra notes 169-90 and accompanying text.
In its original form, ILSA was enacted as Chapter IX of Title XIV, Housing and Urban

Development Act of 1968. The Act became effective April 28, 1969.
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THE APPLICATION OF ILSA TO CONDOMINIUM SALES

A.

ILSA 's Coverage and Protections

As its name implies, ILSA is designed to promote full and fair disclosure
by interstate sellers of real estate." The Act is unmistakably patterned after
the Securities Act of 1933.1' Protection for consumers lies in the requirement
that developers utilizing interstate commerce furnish to purchasers detailed property reports prior to the signing of any contract.4" The Act also requires sellers
to file a statement of record with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)." Neither of these documents may contain an untrue statement of a material fact. 44 If the seller fails to provide the buyer with a satisfactory
property report prior to the sale, ILSA authorizes the buyer to rescind the
contract within two years from the date of signing s Nothing in the Act requires
the buyer to show fraud or misdealings in order to achieve rescission.
ILSA does not completely preempt regulation of interstate land sales to the
federal government. The Secretary of HUD is authorized to accept state registration in lieu of federal registration upon determining that the state's filing
provisions are sufficiently protective. 4 Four states (California, Florida, Hawaii,

40.

15 U.S.C. §5 1701-1720 (1982). The key language of the statute appears in 5 1703(a)(l):
It shall be unlawful for any developer or agent, directly or indirectly, to make
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce, or of the mails (1) with respect to the sale or lease of any lot not exempt under section 1702
of this title (A) to sell or lease any lot unless a statement of record with respect to
such lot is in effect in accordance with section 1706 of this title;
(B)
to sell or lease any lot unless a printed property report, meeting the
requirements of section 1707 of this title, has been furnished to the purchaser
or lessee in advance of the signing of any contract or agreement by such
purchaser or lessee;
(C) to sell or lease any lot where any part of the statement of record
or the property report contained an untrue statement of a material fact or
omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein pursuant to
sections 1704 through 1707 of this title or any regulation thereunder; or
(D) to display or deliver to prospective purchasers or lessees advertising
and promotional material which is inconsistent with information required to
be disclosed in the property reports.
41.
For a comparison of the similarities between ILSA and the Securities Act, see Walsh,
Consumer Protection in Land Development Sales, 5 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 167 (1970).
42. 15 U.S.C. 5 1703(a)(1)(B) (1982). The list of things to be included in the property report
is extensive. See 15 U.S.C. § 1705 (1982). See also 24 C.F.R. §§ 1710.100-.310 (1984). For a
summary of these requirements, see Kerr, Guide to the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act A
Checklist for Developers, 4 REAL EsTArE L.J. 416, 424-25 (1976).
43. 15 U.S.C. 5 1703(a)(1)(A) (1982).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a)(1)(C) (1982). The Act also includes a general subsection intended
to preclude fraudulent practices of any type. 15 U.S.C. § 1 7 03(a)(2) (1982).
45. 15 U.S.C. 5 1703(c) (1982). The Act also provides that the buyer shall have an absolute
right to rescission for a week after the contract is signed, and that the contract shall clearly delineate
this right. 15 U.S.C. § 1703(b) (1982).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1708 (1982).
(a)

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol37/iss5/2
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and New York) were originally approved under this provision. 41 Commentators
noted,48 however, that this procedure does not eliminate the necessity of multiple
registration. Developers would still be required to register in each state in which
49
they planned to advertise.
ILSA does not apply to every interstate sale of real estate,5" Generally, the
Act excludes small real estate salesmen from its coverage. According to section
1703(a), the Act applies only to "developers" who make use of the mails or
interstate commerce. 5' The Act is further limited in scope by the numerous
exemptions contained in section 1702. Section 1702(a)(1) exempts the small
developer who sells or leases "lots in a subdivision containing less than twentyfive lots."5'

2

Subsection (2) exempts "the sale or lease of any improved land

on which there is a residential, commercial, condominium, or industrial building, or the sale or lease of land under a contract obligating the seller or lessor
3
to erect such a building thereon within a period of two years.' '
This latter exemption is significant, as it represents the only appearance of
the word "condominium" in the Act.5 4 In contrast, the main protective provisions of ILSA apply to the sale or lease of "lots.

' '

5

Nowhere in the Act did

Congress define the word "lot," and this oversight has become a major problem. Taken together, sections 1702(a)(2) and 1703(a)(1) pose difficulties in statutory construction. The legislative history of ILSA is helpful, but it by no
means resolves the matter.
B.

Legislative History

The hearings which preceded the passage of ILSA focused primarily on the
fraudulent sale of undeveloped land.5 6 The underlying assumption appears to
47.

24 C.F.R. 5 1710.25 (1970). This provision was subsequently deleted. See 24 G.F.R.

5"

1710.500 (1984).
48. See Comment, Regulation of Interstate Land Sales, 25 STAN. L. REv. 605, 615-16 (1973);
Minahan, State and Federal Regulation of Condominiums, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 55, 76 (1974).

49.
50.

Minahan, supra note 48, at 76.
For a full examination of the exemptions available under ILSA, see Steenhoek & Martin,

Exemptions from t&t Registration Requirements of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 REAL PROP.,
PRoB. & TR. J. 334 (1980). For a general overview of ILSA, see Gandal, General Outline of the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 3 REAL ESTATE L.J. 3 (1974); Kerr, supra note 42; Martin,

Complying with the Registration Requirements of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 18 PRAc.
33 (1972); Comment, A Handbook to the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 27

ARK.

LAw.

L. REv. 65

(1973).
51.

15 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (1982). A developer is defined as "any person who, directly or

indirectly, sells or leases, or advertises for sale or lease any lots in a subdivision." 15 U.S.C. 5
1701(5) (1982).

52.

15 U.S.c. 5 170f(a)(1) (1982).

53.
54.

15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(2) (1982).
The word "condominium" was added to subsection (2) by amendment in 1978. Housing

and Community Development Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-557, § 907, 92 Stat. 2080,
2127.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a)(1) (1982).
56. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. During congressional debate, Senator Williams described the Senate hearings as follows:
During past hearings, the committee has learned that only 23 states have enacted

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
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have been the application of ILSA to the sale of raw land rather than condominiums. This assumption, taken together with the use of "lot" and no
concomitant mention of condominiums, tends to support the exclusion of condominiums from the Act's purview.
Matters of interpretation became more complex, however, with the creation
of the Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration (OILSR) to administer the
Act.57 In 1972, OILSR issued an advisory opinion which concluded that con'
It subsequently
dominium units were included within the definition of "lots."
'9
adopted this position in the fbrm of regulations. The Administrator of OILSR
explained the agency's position by reasoning that condominiums carry the "indicia" of real estate, whether or not the units have been constructed"' OILSR
accordingly viewed a condominium as equivalent to a subdivision, each unit
being equivalent to a lot.'
Some commentators have questioned this conclusion. " OILSR's judgment
is by no means dispositive. 6 ' Although an administrative agency's interpretation
of a federal statute is entitled to great weight, the agency cannot exceed its
authority and contravene congressional intent. 4 Statutory construction is the
specific province of the courts. 65 Thus, resolution of this matter will depend on
whether a court accepts OILSR's pronouncement or whether it decides to ex66

amine the legislative history itself.

Congress created more confusion in 1978 by amending ILSA to include the
word "condominium" in the exemption provided in section 1702(a)(2). 7 This
legislation to protect consumers against abuses in the interstate sale of undeveloped land...
[Ilt has been estimated that unscrupulous land promoters have caused our citizens to lose
approximately $50 million. These promoters have by the use of high pressure sales techniques sold land in swamps, flood control areas, deserts, mountains, remote valleys and
- in some cases - jungle lava beds outside the continental United States.
1968 CoNG. REc. 15,271 (May 28, 1968) (emphasis supplied).
57. 24 C.F.R. § 1700.15 (1970).
58. Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration, Advisory Opinion No. 1710.1(k) (Aug. 20,
1972) (cited in Winter, infra note 66, at 1291).
59. 38 Fed. Reg. 23,866 (1973) (Introduction to Regulations). The current version of the
regulations takes note of the case law discussing the lot/condominium controversy. 24 C.F.R. 1710
app. A (1985).
60. 38 Fed. Reg. 23,866 (1973). OILSR's policy caused little concern to condominium developers prior to 1972, due to the agency's weak enforcement of ILSA. The evolution of OILSR's
enforcement policy is examined in Note, supra note 22.
61. 38 Fed. Reg. 23,866 (1973).
62. See, e.g., Note, supra note 31, at 659. But see Krasnowicki, Townhouses with Homes Associations: A New Perspective, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 711, 746 (1975); Peretz, supra note 4, at 297.

63. In fact, Congress apparently intended OILSR to possess very limited discretionary powers.
Congress adopted self-disclosure as the central feature of ILSA, and specifically rejected a proposal
which would have allowed the administrative agency to advise the purchaser of the fairness of the
developer's offering. Coffey & Welch, supra note 12, at 17.
64. Volkswagenwerk AktiengeseUschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968).
65.

Id.

66. At least one court has opted for the latter course. Winter v. Hollingsworth Properties,
587 F. Supp. 1289, 1293 (S.D. Fla. 1984), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1444 (11th Cir. 1985). Seeinfra notes
83-92 and accompanying text.
67.

See supra note 54.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol37/iss5/2
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addition can be interpreted in two ways. One view is that Congress would not
specifically exempt certain condominiums (those that must be completed within
two years) unless the Act covered condominiums in the first pla~e. Otherwise,
the amendment would be superfluous. This interpretation is bolstered by the
fact that Congress adopted the 1978 amendments with at least constructive
knowledge that OILSR considered condominiums within the Act's purview, and
that one major court 8 had reached the same conclusion. Despite these actions,
Congress chose not to amend the statute to exempt condominiums, but instead
acted to exempt only certain condominiums. Since Congress had notice of these
interpretations, its amendment apparently constituted an implied adoption of
them.

69

The second view7" imputes to Congress a much narrower intent in passing
the amendment. Starting from the premise that the Act generally applies only
to sales of land, one can readily interpret the exemption in section 1702(a)(2)
as a rejection of OILSR's position. Section 1702(a)(2) refers to the sale of
"land" on which rests a condominium. Given this phrasing, the exemption
would not necessarily operate to imply the inclusion of condominiums in section
1703. When Congress employs a term in one section of a statute and excludes
it in another, the term should not be implied where excluded. 71 Advocates of
the second view would therefore contend that a land sales contract is exempted
from the provisions of ILSA if the parties have bargained for a completed unit,
or for one to be completed within two years.
Congress again considered the matter of condominiums during hearings on
amendments made to ILSA in 1979. The House Committee concluded that
state regulation of condominiums provided sufficient protection, and that the
federal government need not expand its disclosure requirements into this area.72
This conclusion appears to be a relatively clear statement of legislative intent
not to apply ILSA to condominium sales. Yet, in light of ILSA's complex
legislative history, it is not surprising that the courts have had difficulty reaching
a consensus in their interpretations of the Act.
C.

Case Law

Although many courts have construed the various provisions in ILSA, few
have passed on the precise question of the Act's applicability to condominiums.
The Delaware Supreme Court, in Nargiz v. Henlopen Developers, was the first to
do so. 73 The plaintiff in Nargiz entered into a contract to purchase a unit in
68. Nargiz v. Henlopen Developers, 380 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1977).
69. Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a
statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change. Lorillard, Inc.
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978).
70. See Winter v. Hollingsworth Properties, 587 F. Supp. 1289, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 1984), rev'd,
777 F.2d 1444 (11th Cir. 1985).
71. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1963).
72. See H.R. REP. No. 154, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 29, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2345.
73. 380 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1977). Section 1719 of ILSA grants to the state courts concurrent
jurisdiction with the federal courts to decide liability based on the Act. 15 U.S.C. 5 1719 (1982).
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a condominium project then under construction. The contract contained no
provision requiring the developer to complete the building by a definite date,74
so the contract was not within the exclusion granted in section 1702(a)(2). The
developer failed to provide the plaintiff with a property report, as required by
section 1703(a)(1). Prior to closing, the plaintiff decided not to complete the
7
purchase and sued for rescission under section 1703(b). 1
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment for the defendant developer at the trial level and held that ILSA applied to sales of condominium units.16 The court considered itself constrained to follow OILSR's
interpretation of ILSA.77 Thus OILSR's interpretation, seemingly at odds with
ILSA's legislative history, proved the decisive factor in light of the absence of
any applicable case law.78
The court further held that the contract for purchase did not fall within the
section 1702(a)(2) exemption, 7'J notwithstanding the fact that the developer had
actually completed the units within two years of the date of the contract. The
court acknowledged that its holding could permit a condominium purchaser to
perpetrate a fraud on a good faith developer. However, the court read the
statutory language literally and ruled that it required the contract to bind the
developer to complete the project within two years to qualify for the exemption."
Since this requirement was not followed, the court recognized the plaintiff's
right to rescission and return of his earnest money deposits."'
The first reported 2 federal decision construing ILSA's applicability to condominium sales was Winter v. Hollingsworth Properties"" (Winter I). The facts in
Winter I were similar to those in Nargiz. The plaintiffs were members of a
partnership which reneged on a contract to purchase condominium units. They
sued for rescission and return of their security deposits pursuant to section
1703(c) of ILSA. The District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied
relief to the plaintiffs and held that ILSA does not apply to the sale of con84
dominium units.
74. 380 A.2d at 1362.
75. Id at 1363.
76. Id at 1364.
77. Id
78. The Nargiz court did attempt some independent interpretations, however. It reasoned that
the contract was not for improved property, but for raw land which was later to be improved. In
this sense, the court appeared to be trying to reconcile its judgment with ILSA's legislative history.
In fact, the court advanced the novel proposition that this was a contract for "real estate later to
be created." Id.
79. At the time Nargiz was decided, this exemption was codified as 15 U.S.C. § 17 02(a)(3).
As noted earlier, it did not yet contain the word "condominium." See supra note 54.
80. Nargiz, 380 A.2d at 1364-65.
81.
Id. at 1365. Compare Mosher v. Southridge Assoc., 552 F. Supp. 1226 (W.D. Pa. 1982)
(condominium sale exempt from application of ILSA where the contract provided for completion
and delivery of the unit within 24 months).
82. In an unreported 1978 decision, the District of Maryland federal court relied on Nargzz
in holding ILSA applicable to condominium sales. Rubenstein v. Rossmoor Const. Corp., No. Y76-1033 (D. Md. March 6, 1978) (available Feb. 1, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
83. 587 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Fla. 1984), rev'd, 777 F.2d 1444 (11th Cir. 1985).
84. Id. at 1291.
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In so holding, the district court explicitly rejected the positions taken by
OILSR and the Delaware Supreme Court in Nargiz.s5 The court conducted an
independent appraisal of ILSA's legislative history86 and concluded that Congress
was concerned solely with the sale of undeveloped land.8 7 The court also engaged
in statutory construction. It noted that the meaning of one term may be defined
by reference to the terms with which it is associated."" Using this technique,
the court substituted the phrase "condominium unit" for the word "lot" in
section 1702, and noted that the resulting provision would be nonsensical. 9
The court also examined OILSR's regulations90 concerning the substantive matters to be contained in the property report and found these requirements inapplicable to condominium units. 91 The court concluded that Congress decided
92
to leave the matter of condominium regulation to state and local governments.
The purchasers appealed the ruling in Winter I to the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida again confronted the lot/condominium issue. In Schatz v.
Jockey Club Phase III, Ltd.,93 Judge Spellman, writing for a different panel within
the Southern District of Florida, stated that "this Court must disagree" -with
the judgment in Winter L 94 Without overruling Winter I, the court held that
ILSA was applicable to condominium sales. 95 Consequently, a split existed within
the Southern District of Florida on the question of ILSA's applicability to
condominium sales.
Until recently, the lot/condominium controversy had not been addressed by
a federal circuit court. 96 The Eleventh Circuit, however, squarely faced the issue

85. Id. at 1294.
86. See supra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
87. Winter, 587 F. Supp. at 1291.
88. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 583 F.2d
61, 65 (2d Cir. 1978) (specific words following a general term limit application of the general term
to things that are similar to the specific words).
89. Winter, 587 F. Supp. at 1295. Judge Gonzalez's discourse on this point may be misguided.
The term "lot" in section 1702 (as elsewhere) is apparently used as a generic term to describe a
quantum of real property rather than a particular type of property.
90. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.100-.310 (1984).
91. Winter, 587 F. Supp. at 1293-94. The court cited to provisions concerned with disclosure
of topography, water coverage, drainage and fill, and oil, gas and mineral rights. Id.
.92. Id. at 1296.
93. 604 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
94. Id. at 540.
95. Id. at 540-41.
96. In 1982, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals examined the subject matter jurisdiction
of a district court to hear an ILSA claim which involved the sale of condominium units. Eaton
v. Dorchester Dev., 692 F.2d 727 (11th Cir. 1982). The court specifically addressed the 100-lot
exemption contained in section 1702(b)(1). See 15 U.S.C. S 1702(b)(1) (1982) (exempting "the sale
or lease of lots in a subdivision containing fewer than one hundred lots which are not exempt
under subsection (a)."). The trial court had granted summary judgment for the defendant developer
on the basis that it qualified for the exemption. 692 F.2d at 728-29. The Eleventh Circuit remanded
the case for further factual determinations as to the number of units in the defendant's project.
Id. at 731. Confining its decision to the matter of subject matter jurisdiction, the court made no
explicit holding that ILSA applied to the sale of condominium units. Id.
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in Winter v. Hollingsworth Properties-" (Winter II). Reversing the judgment for the
developers in Winter I,'" the court held that ILSA applies to the sale of condominium units. 99
The court in Winter II relied primarily on the proposition that an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute must be upheld if it is reasonable.""
The court referred briefly to ILSA's legislative history to demonstrate that
OILSR's position was reasonable. After conceding that Congress, in passing
ILSA, was concerned with the sale of undeveloped land,"" the court offered
three justifications for OILSP,'s interpretation. First, the court noted ILSA's
legislative history employed the terms "lot," "land," and "real estate." 1" 2 Second, the court postulated that a fraudulent interstate sale is no less fraudulent
simply because condominiums are involved."" The third factor advanced by the
court was the 1978 amendment to ILSA inserting the word "condominium"
in an exception to the Act's general provisions."'" The court interpreted this
action as manifesting a congressional intent to apply ILSA to condominium
sales."15 Perhaps appropriately, the court did not discuss the practical effect of
its decision on the condominium industry.
Prior to the Eleventh Circuit's recent reversal in Winter 11, the federal court
system offered state courts little guidance in interpreting ILSA. In construing
a federal statute, the general rule is that state courts are bound by the interpretation of the highest federal court reviewing the statute.""' The pre-Winter
II conflict among district courts left the states to their own interpretations.
Florida courts began the process of interpretation in Dorchester Development v.
Burk." 7 In Burk, Florida's Third District Court of Appeal held a condominium
developer liable under the provisions of ILSA."" The court, however, did not
expressly decide the appropriateness of ILSA's application to condominium sales.
The defendant developer apparendy conceded this threshold issue, and the court's
analysis began with the developer's contention that it qualified for a "two-year
completion" exemption under section 1702(a)(2)."' 9 The court denied the exemption despite the fact that the contract of sale provided the buyers with an

97. 777 F.2d 1444 (11th Cir. 1985).
98. See supra note 83.
99. 777 F.2d at 1449.
100. Id. at 1448.
101. Id. at 1447.
102. Id. at 1448. This point, however, hardly serves as a convincing rationale for including
condominiums within the Act's purview. The court apparently reasoned that the appearance of the
broader term "real estate," together with the other terms represents a congressional intent to include
condominiums.
103. Id. Despite the obvious truth of this contention, its appropriateness in statutory construc-

tion is questionable.
104. Id. at 1448-49. As noted earlier, this amendment does not clearly establish a congressional
intent to apply ILSA to condominium sales. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
105. 777 F.2d at 1448-49.
106. See, e.g., Mobile Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1977).

107. 439 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983).
108.
109.

Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1033. See 15 U.S.C. S 1702(a)(2) (1982).
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option to rescind if the condominiums were not completed in two years. The
court reasoned that the provision limited the buyer's remedy to a refund of
his deposit and that this limitation rendered the developer's completion obligation a nullity."10 As a result, the court rescinded the contract because the
developer had not provided the buyers with a property report as required by
ILSA section 1703(a)(1)(B).'
In retrospect, one could argue that Burk implicitly recognized ILSA's application to condominiums. State courts in Florida now favor this position. In
Appalachian, Inc. v. Olson," 2 the Second District Court of Appeal relied on Burk
in ruling that ILSA applied to the saleU of condominium units." The court
noted the lower court ruling in Winter I, yet chose not to follow it."

4

The weight of authority thus clearly mandates ILSA's application to condominium sales. Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Winter II was
flawed by an undue deference to the position taken by OILSR." 5 In contrast,
the district court's decision in Winter I seems more in accordance with the
statutory intent behind ILSA. More importantly, the district court recognized
that several considerations militate against the application of ILSA to condominium sales. These considerations illustrate that ILSA is an unsatisfactory and
inequitable solution to the problem.
IV.

THE BURDENS OF BROAD

ILSA

APPLICATION

The automatic application of ILSA to condominium sales can yield inequitable results. A court may in effect allow a condominium buyer to speculate
in real estate without risk to himself, and at the expense of the developer. In
Olson, for example, the buyers signed their purchase agreements at a time when
the market for Florida condominiums was strong." 6 The developer suppjied
them with a complete offering circular, as required by Florida law," 7 and the
buyers in fact admitted they had all the relevant information to make a rational
investment decision."" Within two years, however, interest rates rose and the
Florida condominium market became seriously depressed."19 The buyers then
began looking for a way to rescind their contracts and informed the developer

110.

Burk, 439 So. 2d at 1034.

111. Id. at 1035. See also Finst Dev., Inc. v. Bemaor, 449 So. 2d 290, 292 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984)
(court again applied ILSA against a condominium developer without addressing the threshold lot/
condominium issue).
112. 468 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985).
113. Id. at 268. See also Star Island Assoc. v. Lichter, 473 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985)
(developers conceded ILSA's applicability to condominium sales); Marco Bay Assoc. v. Vandewalle,
472 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985) (citing Olson); Grove Towers, Inc. v. Lopez, 467 So. 2d
358 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985) (absent exemption, developer must comply with ILSA's registration
and disclosure requirements).
114. 468 So. 2d at 268.
115. See supra notes 102-04.
116. Appellant's Opening Brief at 1, Olson, 468 So. 2d 266.
117.
118.

FLA. STAT. S 718.504 (1985).
Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, Olson, 468 So. 2d 266.

119.

Id. at 3.
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of their decisions after the latter completed the units.12 0 Florida's Second District
2
Court of Appeal nonetheless granted relief to the buyers.' '
The rescission remedy provided in section 1703(c) is a particularly harsh
one.' 22 It applies when the developer fails to provide a detailed property report
as required in section 1703(a)(1)(B). Section 1703(c) authorizes rescission of the
sales contract and return of deposits even in the absence of fraud and even
where, as in Olson, the developer substantially complies with the disclosure
purposes of the Act. The terms of the Act are absolute; they do not allow the
developer to assert a defense of estoppel.'2 ' The courts have given effect to this
interpretation. Their general policy is to construe ILSA broadly to effect the
24
consumer protection purposes of the Act.
Given such a construction of ILSA, and the potentially high cost to condominium developers, one wonders why many developers have chosen to disregard the Act's requirements. 125 One reason is the confusion over the necessity
for compliance. With the application of ILSA to condominiums heretofore an
unresolved issue, developers' attorneys may have considered noncompliance a
risky,' 26 but acceptable, 2 7 method of cutting corners. For most developers, perhaps the decisive factors in deciding not to comply were the cost of compliance
and the difficulties in complying.
An examination of section 1703 indicates that compliance with the provisions
of ILSA is costly. This section requires a developer to file a statement of record
with HUD and to furnish a detailed property report to all prospective pur-

120.

Id.

121. Olson, 468 So. 2d at 269.
122. See, e.g., Gaudet v. Woodlake Dev. Co., 413 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. La. 1976) (mere
execution of a deed is a violation of ILSA when the developer has not furnished a property report
to the buyer); Rockefeller v. High Sky, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (substantial
compliance with ILSA was not sufficient even when the seller provided information substantially
similar to that required in the property report, and when the buyers were sophisticated business
venturers who had visited the site).
123. See 15 U.S.C. § 1703(c) (1982).
124. See, e.g., McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975) (ILSA construed broadly
to apply not only to the actual developers, but also to the planners of the project); Paquin v. Four
Seasons of Tennessee, Inc., 519 F.2d 1105 (5th Cir. 1975) (purpose behind ILSA is to enable a
purchaser to have access to enough information to allow him to make an informed decision);
Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. IIl. 1977) (ILSA is a flexible antifraud statute and
must be given broad scope).
125. In 1972, for example, OILSR notified 450 land developers that they were violating the
provisions of ILSA. 3 HUD Newsletter, Sept. 18, 1972, at 4.
126. In Olson, the developer filed a cross claim and third party complaint against its attorney
for failing to draft the condominium sales contract in a manner consistent with all applicable laws
and regulations. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6 n.4, Olson, 468 So. 2d 266. For an extensive
treatment of the responsibilities and potential liability of attorneys to the investing public, see Small,
An Attorney's Responsibilities Under Federal and State Securities Laws: Private Counselor or Public Servant?,
61 CALIF. L. REv. 1189 (1973).
127. Unlike the Securities Acts, which grant broad enforcement powers to the SEC, ILSA
places the burden of enforcement on the purchaser. The developer who fails to provide a property
report thus faces a suit only if the purchaser: (1) wants to cancel the agreement; (2) knows about
the provisions in ILSA; and (3) is willing to litigate.
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chasers. The terms to be included in the property report are extensive.' 2 OILSR
has also propounded its own list of requirements.' 29 In addition, the Secretary
of HUD may adopt rules requiring developers to incorporate a wide range of
environmental information into the property report.' 3' The resulting cost to
the magnitude of the develdevelopers is potentially very high, depending on
3
opment plan and various geographical factors.' '
State and federal disclosure laws force developers to duplicate their efforts
in accomplishing essentially the same goal. 32 Some commentators have argued
that this result is desirable for the honest developer, as well as for the purchaser.'33 ILSA puts the legitimate developer on a par with the unscrupulous
one, who otherwise might offer unfair competition through deals that are too
good to be true.1'5 However, state laws, which are now much more comprehensive than when ILSA was originally lenacted, adequately accomplish this
function.

5

Another possible response to the problem of high costs is that the developer
can pass the cost on to the consumer. Residential condominiums have become
the domain of upper-income groups, 13 6 and these groups presumably would not
be deterred from purchasing because of an increase in cost. To justify application of ILSA to condominiums on this basis, however, seems anomalous; after
all, the original purpose behind the Act was protection of the consumer.
In addition to the high cost of compliance, another burden imposed by
ILSA is the difficulty in satisfying the Act's provisions. Compliance may develop
into a self-defeating exercise for developers. For example, even if a developer
makes a good faith effort to assimilate and disseminate the complex information
required in the property report, the purchaser may still find a technical deviation
from the disclosure rules.' 3 7 Substantial compliance-by a developer may not be

128.

See 15 U.S.C. S 1705 (1982).

129.

24 C.F.R. SS 1710.100-.310 (1984).

Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976) (developers required
to prepare a full environmental impact statement in accordance with the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 before their offering became effective).
130.

131.

In addition to these costs, the developer is subjected to multiple filing fees and increased

legal expenses.
132.
133.

See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Note, supra note 15, at 727.

134.
135.

Id.

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. S 718.504 (1985). See also infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
136. Congress expanded the National Housing Act in 1961 to provide for guaranteed mortgage
insurance for condominium ownership. The intent was to alleviate the serious housing shortages
for the nation's middle- and low-income citizens. Developers, however, subsequently channeled their

energies into projects geared toward the high-income market. See generally Quirk & Wein, Homeownership for the Poor: Tenant Condominiums, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, and the

Rockefeller Program, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 811 (1969) (review of 1968 HUD Act and Rockefeller
program in context of the failure of urban renewel for low-income housing); Note, Condominiums
and the 1968 Housing and Urban Development Act: Putting the Poor in Their Place, 43 S. CAL. L. REv.
309 (1970) (examination of the 1968 HUD Act and its efforts to make private urban home ownership
available to lower-income Americans); Note, supra note 31, at 641-42.
137.

The disclosure provisions in ILSA are similar to those in the federal Truth-in-Lending
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recognized as a valid defense. Thus far, the courts have required rigid adherence
to the terms of ILSA.' 3 As a result, the previous uncertainty surrounding the
application of ILSA to condominium sales made noncompliance with the Act
an attractive option.
Developers do, however, have another alternative. They can attempt to
qualify for an exemption under section 1702(a)(2).' 3 9 This qualification will
require inclusion of a clause in the sales contract obligating the developer to
complete the project within two years. As Burk demonstrates, however, such a
clause must be extremely precise.'"' Drafting such a clause would require a
careful review of all limitation of remedy provisions. Since these provisions are
commonplace in condominium sales agreements, 4 ' Burk causes a major disruption in conventional drafting practices. Another infirmity in the section
1702(a)(2) exemption is that it fails to contemplate plans for phased development
of condominiums. No court has determined whether the two-year exemption
applies to this type of plan, and at least one commentator has concluded that
ILSA requires all common elements of the plan to be completed within two
years. 42 Such a requirement places an unnecessary burden on the industry's
43
use of a popular form of development.
These several burdens imposed by ILSA might be justified if the Act were
effective in discharging its purpose. However, ILSA's effectiveness in protecting
the consumer is questionable. A disclosure statute by itself merely provides for
the availability of information; it does not guarantee that such information will
be relied upon or even understood if read. Several commentators have strongly
attacked the effectiveness of full disclosure requirements.' 4 The complexity of
prospectuses is now such that a layman is incapable of comprehending them.
Buyers can consult attorneys, but often do not bother. While the securities
market relies primarily on independent professional advice, the real property
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1982). Creditors have long claimed that it is impossible to devise
loan forms which comply with the Truth-in-Lending Act and its regulations. A similar argument
can be made concerning ILSA's property report. For overviews of the problems encountered under
the Truth-in-Lending Act, see Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in Lending, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 669

(1977) (comparison of TIL's benefits with the considerable harrassment it causes creditors); Warren
& Larmore, Truth in Lending: ProbL',ns of Coverage, 24 STAN. L. REv. 793 (1972) (attempt to define
the necessary scope of compliance under TIL).
138. See, e.g., Rockefeller v. High Sky, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
139. Some developers who changed their operations in order to secure an exemption have
expended more time and energy in qualifying for the exemption than they would have spent in
complying with ILSA. See Walsh, The Role of the Federal Government in Land Development Sales, 47

267, 268 (1971).
See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
Peretz, supra note 4, at 297.
Note, supra note 31, at 661 n.111.
For a discussion of the factors developers consider in deciding whether to phase a project,
Representing the Condominium Developer: Tending the Paper Jungle, 10 REAL PROP., PROB. &
TRUST J. 471, 471-74 (1975).
NOTRE

DAME LAW.

140.
141.
142.
143.
see Geis,

144. See, e.g., Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus. LAW. 300
(1961); Mann, Prospectuses: Unreadable orJust Unread? - A Proposal to Reexamine Policies Against Permztting
Projections, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 222 (1971); Rosenstein, Inadequacies of Current Condominium
Legislation - A Critical Look at the Pennsylvania Unit Property Act, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 655 (1974).
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area may not, especially when low- and middle-income purchasers are involved.' 45 Unlike the real estate market, the purchase of securities has largely
46
been institutionalized, thus effectively replacing the novice investor.'
Situations may arise in which complex disclosure laws are actually harmful
to purchasers. ILSA's extensive regulations allow developers to conceal material
facts amidst a plethora of technical legal documents. In light of these considerations, one must question the desirability of adding ILSA's disclosure requirements to those contained in the state codes.
V.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO

ILSA

The various criticisms of ILSA and its coverage of condominium sales do
not imply that the federal government cannot play a constructive role in condominium regulation. Several commentators- have suggested alternative methods
of dealing with interstate sales of condominiums. 47 One approach would require
each state to adopt a uniform act relating to registration and disclosure. Rather
than registering nationwide, developers could register in one state, presumably
the one in which the condominiums are located. This approach appears to work
nicely in theory, but state intransigence would likely block its adoption. 48 The
likelihood of convincing each state to adopt a model consumer protection statute,
regardless 'of regional variations in the condominium industry, is slim. 49
A second option would involve federal preemption of the area. This solution
also has drawbacks. Current federal legislation is ill-equipped to regulate the
unique methods of developer self-dealing which occur in condominium agreements.150 Congress could pattern a new federal statute after one of the state
codes, but has already indicated its unwillingness to preempt the area of land
sales. '51 Congress rejected the idea of preemption when many states threatened
52
to block the passage of ILSA.
Any realistic proposal for change must therefore be one which is acceptable
to the states. One solution satisfies this requirement, while arguably improving
ILSA's protections. Under this plan, Congress would render an interstate sale
of condominiums violative of the affected state's laws a federal offense, and
grant the state's attorney general access to the federal courts for extraterritorial
injunctions.0 3 This proposal is palatable to the states because it allows them
145. Note, supra note 31, at 649 n.51.
146. Note, supra note 15, at 728 n.113.
147. For a review of these various proposals, see Comment, supra note 48, at 617-21.
148. Id. at 620.
149. The "uniform act" proposal is further undermined by the fact that some states may
interpret and administer the statute differently than others, effectively destroying its uniformity. Id.
at 617.
150. See infta notes 169-90 and accompanying text. Unlike the several state statutes, ILSA is
a simple disclosure statute.
151. See generally 1966 Hearings, supra note 10.
152. See id. at 161-62, 165 (statements of Senators Mondale and Williams).
153. One commentator observed that this approach was previously suggested by the Attorney
General of California. Note, supra note 15, at 727 n.106. The U.S. House of Representatives
considered a similar plan before eliminating it from the House version of the Securities Act of
1933. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933).
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to retain sovereignty over the condominium industry in their respective jurisdictions. It would also provide for effective enforcement of interstate transactions, one of the functions currently served by ILSA.
Some commentators have opposed this proposal in the past because it would
result in a lack of uniformity in the law, and lead to forum-shopping by developers. '14 These criticisms are no longer as compelling as they once were.
When Congress enacted ILSA, state condominium statutes were uniformly ineffective in protecting the consumer.' S Modern state codes, however, are at
least as protective as ILSA.- 6 Most jurisdictions now provide for some form
of disclosure similar to that in ILSA. ' " Thus, while some state statutes are
indeed more comprehensive than others, even the weaker state codes provide
protections on a par with ILSA. ILSA's disclosure requirements may be more
extensive than those in some states but, as noted earlier, ',"the effectiveness of
disclosure provisions is not necessarily proportionate to their complexity.
This proposal also has several practical advantages. First, it eliminates the
necessity of multiple registration by the developer and the attendant costs in
producing several different prospectuses. Under this plan, the developer need
only register in one state. Congress can effectively limit the problem of forum
shopping by requiring developers to register in the state in which their condominiums are located.' ,9 Second, the proposed solution would permit greater
protection for purchasers by allowing them both federal and state remedies.
One commentator has noted that if federal enforcement were the buyer's only
recourse, the caseload would be too heavy for the federal apparatus." v' Many
buyers might then be left without relief.'
The proposal advocated here would
allocate the burden among state and federal courts: state courts would provide
remedies for intrastate transactions and the state attorney general could utilize
the federal courts, when necessary, to enforce judgments on interstate sales.
Another advantage to the proposed solution lies in the doctrine of creative
154. Note, supra note 15, at 727 n.106.
155. For a discussion of these "first generation" condominium codes, see Schreiber, The Lateral
Housing Development: Condominium or Home Owners Association?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1104 (1969);
P 2senstein, supra note 144; Note, Areas of Dispute in Condominium Law, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
979 (1976).
156.
Most go beyond disclosure and provide other protections. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 718
(1985). &e also infra note 157.
157. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAr. §§ 47-67 to -90(c) (1977); FLA. STAT. 5 718.503-.504 (1985);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1601(e) to -1645(e) (1978); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 514A-1 to -94 (Supp.
1977); ILL. REV. STAr. ch. 30 § :101-331 (1977 & Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN 5 9-1 121
to -1142 (West Supp. 1978); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §5 559.1-.39 (West 1967 & Supp. 1978);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.500-.690 (1977); VA. CODE S§ 55-79.39 to -79.103 (Supp. 1976).
158. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
159. This requirement would, for the most part, force registration in those states where the
condominium industry is vigorous, and where state codes are likely to be more comprehensive in
protecting the consumer. For example the Florida code, supra note 156, has the most detailed
disclosure requirements of any state statute. Note, To Tell the Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing
But the Truth - Help for Florida's Frazzled Condominium Buyers?, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 387, 392
(1975).
160. Comment, supra note 48, at 615 n.89.
161.
Id.
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federalism. Advocates of this doctrine argue that the federal government should
allow individual states to experiment in novel social and economic legislation
in the hopes of discovering better solutions to the nation's problems. 162 In the
area of condominium sales, most states have chosen to provide their residents
with greater protections than those afforded by ILSA. The Florida code,' 63 for
example, attempts to lessen the purchaser's burden in reading complex prospectuses by requiring the developer to include certain provisions in the sales
contract and highlight them in boldface type.' 64 In addition, Florida has established an administrative agency16. to police condominium sales offerings so that
the burden of enforcement is not totally on the purchaser.' 66 The federal government should encourage this type of innovation rather than stifle it.
The proposed solution would not only be less burdensome than extending
ILSA's coverage to condominiums, but would also be more effective. ILSA is
a simple disclosure statute. Disclosure laws are effective only in combatting
fraud and misrepresentation in a transaction, and even then their effectiveness
depends on purchasers' ability to comprehend the technical information disclosed
to them. 67 State statutes, on the other hand, go beyond disclosure and address
problems unique to condominium transactions. '6 In particular, disclosure provisions disregard two practices which condominium developers have engaged in
at the expense of purchasers:' 69 (1) the use of long-term management, or "sweetheart," contracts and leases; and (2) the misuse of security deposits. The following pages will explore these two types of abuse, focusing on the legislative
7
response in Florida.' '
The use of sweetheart contracts or leases is perhaps the most onerous form
of developer self-dealing. This scheme has several variations.' 7' Typically, the
162.

See Statement of Justice Brandeis, quoted in L. Loss & E. CowErr, supra note 18, at 238.

163. FLA. STAT. ch. 718 (1985).
164. See FLA. STAT. S 718.503 (1985).
165. This agency is entitled the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile
Homes. FLA. STAT. § 718.501 (1985). The agency has established a Bureau of Condominiums with
a mandate to educate condominium purchasers as to their legal rights. For a discussion of the
Bureau's activities, see Mayberry, The Bureau of Condominiums - Its Functions and Goals, 55 FLA.

B.J. 139 (1981).
166.
167.
168.

FLA. STAT. § 718.501(1) (1985).
See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
For discussions of two specific state codes, see Merrill, Cooper & Papell, An Overview of

California Condominium I.Aw, 6 Sw. U.L. REv. 487 (1974); Note, The Georgia Condominium Act of
1975: A Sound Basis for lnnovative Condominium Practice, 24 EMoRY L.J. 891 (1975).
169. For an overview of developer self-dealings in Florida prior to the passage of the current
condominium code, see Note, Florida Condominiums - Developer Abuses and Securities Law Implications
Create a Need for a State Regulatoty Agency, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 350 (1973).
170. The Florida code is drafted primarily with the residential condominium in mind. For a
discussion of the particular problems relating to commercial condominiums, see Note, Commercial
Condominiums: Statutory Roadblocks to Development, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 432 (1982).
171. See, e.g., Point East Mgt. Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp., 282 So. 2d

628 (Fla. 1973) (developers both managed and leased the premises), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921
(1974); Wechsler v. Goldman, 214 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1968) (developer retained title to

the recreational facilities and charged the unit owners excessive rent for the use of the facilities);
Fountainview Ass'n v. Bell, 203 So. 2d 657 (3d D.C.A. 1967) (developers entered into a long-
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developer forms a condominium association while the units are under construction. A condominium association is the body responsible for the operation of
the condominium as a whole.' 72 The developer then establishes a separate corporation to act as a management corporation for the condominium.' 73 The
developer, acting on behalf of the condominium association, enters into a longterm contract with the management corporation to manage the condominium
for the next several years. Because the developer controls both entities, he is
able to establish exorbitant rates for the services of his management corporation.
The developer then sells the units subject to the management contract and
relinquishes control of the condominium association to the new owners. The
174
latter are bound by the terms of the contract negotiated by the developer.
In a related practice, the developer maintains title to the land and leases
it to the condominium owners at commercially unreasonable rates.' 75 Alternatively, the developer can transfer the condominium unit in fee but keep title
to the common recreational facilities, which he leases back to the owners at
excessive' 76 rates and for long periods. 7 7 In either case, condominium owners
are at the mercy of the developer if they wish to make use of the common
areas in the condominium.' 7 8
The first generation of state condominium statutes could not control these
practices. Like ILSA, they provided only for full disclosure of all terms prior
to sale. Disclosure of terms relating to a sweetheart contract, however, would
help only those few purchasers sophisticated enough to recognize the full significance of these terms.'" Moreover, purchasers could not look to the courts
for relief from these agreements. Florida courts"(' consistently held that the
condominium developer could contract with himself prior to the sale of any
units.'"' The courts reasoned that the developer owed no fiduciary duty to the

term management contract with a corporation they controlled), aff'd per curiam, 214 So. 2d 609
(Fla. 1968).
172. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 718.111, .114 (1985).
173. The description given here parallels the excellent summary presented in Commentary,
Florida's Condominium Act - 1974 Amendments: Protection Against Unconscionable Management Contracts,
5 STETSON INTRAMURAL L. REv. 1 (1975).
174. Id. See also Krebs, The Legislative Response to "Sweetheart" Management Contracts: Protecting the
Condominium Purchaser, 55 CH.[-]KE:NT L. REv. 319 (1979).
175. See Note, supra note 31, at 644. State statutes commonly allow a condominium to be
constructed on a leasehold. E.g., FLA. STAT. 5 718.104(1) (1985).
176. The I.R.S. has concluded that a reasonable rate of return for rental income from recreational leases is eight percent of the cost of recreation land and improvements. It considers returns
above eight percent excessive, and gives the excess special tax treatment. See Emanuel, Condominium
Developers and the Internal Revenue Service The Florida Story, 2 REAL ESTATE L.J. 760 (1974).
177.
Note, supra note 31, at 644.
178. See supra note 155.
179.
Note, supra note 31, at 643.
180. During the periods in which the first-generation statutes were in force, Florida was apparently the only jurisdiction to experience developer self-dealing cases. Comment, Condominiums Developer Self-Dealing, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 295, 301 (1975).
181. Point East Mgt. Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp., 282 So. 2d 628, 631-32
(Fla. 1973) (Ervin, J., disenting), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974); Riviera Condominium Apts.,
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purchaser until the time of the purchase.8 2
The Florida Legislature responded to this situation in 1974 by revising its
Condominium Act. 3 The current version of the code effectively eliminates the
problem of sweetheart contracts by imposing on the officers and directors of
the condominium association a fiduciary duty toward the unit owners.' 14 The
code also outlines several unfair practices in management leases and creates a
presumption that contracts containing certain provisions are unconscionable and
therefore voidable.8 5 Even in the absence of unconscionability, unit owners can
terminate any management contract upon an affirmative vote of seventy-five
percent of the owners. s6 The specificity of these provisions checking sweetheart
contracts demonstrates the Florida code is generally more effective than ILSA
in protecting condominium purchasers.
The second area of concern in condominium transactions involves the developer's misuse of security deposits. First-generation condominium statutes placed
few, if any, restrictions on how developers could utilize security deposits received
from purchasers. 87 Undercapitalized developers often used them to defray construction costs. If the developer went bankrupt or the project failed, purchasers
often were left without remedy because they usually failed to acquire a lien on
the property. ' "
In the preceding scenario, the purchasers suffered as a result of the developer's poor judgment rather than because of a conscious design. However, the
developer could also use security deposits in a scheme to defraud purchasers.
In one such scheme, a developer contemplating bankruptcy could disperse the
deposit money through corporate salaries and screen it from creditors, including
the purchasers. 8 9 In another approach, the "developer" could collect security
deposits with no intent to construct the condominium; rather, he would deposit
the money in interest bearing accounts or speculate in other ventures. After
informing the purchasers that the project had "fallen through," the developer
would return their deposits but retain the accrued interest.1'11
The Florida Legislature amended its condominium code to limit severely
the developer's opportunities for self-dealing. The Florida code now requires
the developer to deposit in an escrow account all security payments up to ten
Inc. v. Weinberger, 231 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1970); Wechsler v. Goldman, 214 So. 2d

741 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1968).
182.

Fountainview Ass'n v. Bell, 203 So. 2d 657 (3d D.C.A. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 214 So.

2d 609 (Fla. 1968) (Ervin, J., dissenting). For a complete review of the case law, see Krebs, supra
note 174; Commentary, supra note 173; Comment, supra note 180.
183. See Commentary, supra note 173.
184. FLA. STAT. S 718.111(1) (1985).

185.

FLA. STAT.

S

718.122 (1985).

See also FLA. STAT. 5 718.301 (1985), which requires developers to relinquish control of the association within a certain period of time, depending on the
percentage of units conveyed to purchasers..- 186.

FLA. STAT. 5 718.302 (1985).

187. Comment, Legal Protection for Florida Condominium and Cooperative Buyers and Owners, 27 U.
MIAMi L. REv. 451, 459 (1973).
188. Note, supra note 31, at 644.

189. See Comment, supra note 187, at 460.
190. Note, supra note 169, at 358.
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percent of the purchase price.'' Once building has begun, a developer may
use payments in excess of ten percent for construction purposes, but only if
the purchaser is informed of this right in bold-face type on the contract of
sale. '9 2 These funds cannot be used for salaries, commissions or related expenses.' If the developer fails to comply with these provisions, the sales contract
is voidable and the buyer can reclaim the security deposit plus any accrued
interest in the escrow account.' 94 Moreover, the developer who fails to comply
has committed a third degree felony.' 95 Together, these provisions in the Florida
statute effectively stifle a developer's incentive to misuse deposit funds. They
also guard against the failure of inefficient, but good-faith developers.
The Florida condominium code includes many other consumer-oriented provisions.'" For example, it retains extensive disclosure provisions. ''" In contrast
to ILSA, however, the Florida statute does not summarily punish good faith
developers who fail to satisfy the disclosure requirements. The statute establishes
a defense of substantial compliance for good faith developers.' " Furthermore,
it provides buyers with a cause of action for rescission or damages only when
they have reasonably relied on a false or misleading statement.' 99 The Florida
code thus balances the equities between developer and purchaser more effectively
than ILSA.
Although the Florida statute is one of the stronger state codes, 2"' other
jurisdictions offer similar protections. 2"' These protections are geared specifically
to condominium sales and reach far beyond anything contained in ILSA. Using
the federal courts to enforce these state provisions affords a suitable alternative
to the burdensome application of ILSA.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The question of whether to apply the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act to the sale of condominium units is more than one of purely academic
interest or statutory construction. As Olson2 2 demonstrates, a great deal of money
191. The director of the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes
is authorized to waive this requirement if the developer posts a surety bond or other adequate
assurances. FLA. STAT. § 718.202(1) (1985).
192. FLA. STAT. § 718.202(3) (1985).
193. Id.
194. FLA. STAT. § 718.202(5) (1985).
195. FLA. STAT. § 718.202(7) (1985).
196. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 718.203 (1985) (codifies the implied warranty of fitness and merchantability).
197. FLA. STAT. §§ 718.503-.50-1 (1985). For an extended discussion of these disclosure requirements, see Note, supra note 159. In Olson, the court recognized the "comprehensive and
detailed" nature of the Florida disclosure provisions, but concluded that it had "no choice" but
to enforce the remedies afforded by ILSA. 468 So. 2d at 269.
198. FLA. STAT. § 718.505 (1985).
199. FLA. STAT. § 718.506 (1985).
200.

Set Wright, Florida Condominium Law: A Lesson for Missouri, 34 Mo. B.J. 330 (1978).

201.

Seesupra note 157. For an extended bibliography of current state statutes, see 4b R.
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 633.33 (1981).
See Appalachian, Inc. v. Olson, 468 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985).

POWELL,

202.
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depends on the determination of this matter. Until recently, the dubious stance
of some courts and the conflict among others resulted in a disconcerting state
of uncertainty. The decision in Winter 11 has now settled the issue, at least in
the Eleventh Circuit. Therefore, a change can occur only by a pointed congressional amendment defining the word "lot," or by an authoritative pronouncement of another federal circuit court.
While OILSR's interpretation may be reasonable as far as statutory construction is concerned, it is patently unreasonable in the results it produces.
This Note has suggested the desirability of excluding the sale of condominium
units from the coverage of ILSA. This conclusion follows from the legislative
history of the Act; from the high cost and great difficulty in complying with
the Act's provisions; from the ineffectiveness of disclosure laws in regard to
condominiums; and from the greater ability of state statutes to protect the
condominium purchaser. In light of these considerations, extending the coverage
of ILSA to a fundamentally different type of property would be inappropriate.
ILSA's disclosure provisions are ill-equipped to handle the types of abuses
which arise in condominium transactions. Moreover, ILSA goes beyond consumer protection in legitimate transactions by transforming disclosure into a
sword for the purchaser rather than a shield. In permitting purchasers to rescind
sales contracts even in the absence of fraud, ILSA forces the courts to enrich
the purchaser unjustly at the developer's expense.20 3 State laws, on the other
hand; are both more effective and more equitable. They specifically address
developer abuses in condominium sales and typically provide for rescission only
in the event of fraud or misdealing. The proposed alternative would utilize the
more appropriately tailored state codes, yet provide remedies for interstate
transgressions.
JAMEs L. OLIVIER
203.

See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
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